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Abstract— This research evaluates the performance of 
different defence mechanisms used in IPv6 networks to protect 
against router advertisement (RA) flood attacks that rely in 
ICMPv6 Router Advertisement messages to flood the network. 
Three types of RA flood attacks are considered: the default RA 
flood attack, RA flood attack with fragmented packets and RA 
flood attack with extended header packets. The victim machine 
is considered to be Linux Debian operating system. The defence 
mechanisms analysed here are: Access Control Lists, Disable 
Router Discovery, RA Guard, Validate Source MAC and VLAN. 
The performance is measured according to TCP throughput, 
TCP round-trip time (RTT) and CPU utilisation.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
IPv6 is developed to replace IPv4, overcome its weakness and 
improve the performance. However, IPv6 is susceptible to 
threats such as Denial of Service (DoS) attacks [1, 2, 3]. 
Neighbour Discovery Protocol (NDP) in IPv6 uses Internet 
Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) Router Advertisement 
messages to find neighbouring routers and to enable 
computers to generate IPv6 addresses for themselves (link-
local IPv6). The former process is called router discovery 
(RD) and the later process is called Stateless Address 
Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) [4, 5]. Since Router 
Advertisements do not use authentication, they can be 
misused to launch link-local DoS attacks called Router 
Advertisement (RA) flood attacks, which stop victim nodes 
from functioning and might cause the entire network to 
cripple. 
Many solutions relying on other advanced security 
techniques are proposed to protect against NDP attacks. A 
Secure Neighbour Discovery protocol was developed to 
protect the neighbour discovery packets from any attack, such 
as modification or replaying and providing mechanisms to 
authenticate the routers [6]. In [7] a proposal was presented to 
map and bind between IPv6 addresses, MAC addresses and 
public keys of the network nodes. The mechanism prevented 
IP address spoofing, which is often used in DoS attacks. A 
monitoring protocol to compare the packet contents to 
database entries and discard any mismatch was presented in 
[2]. [8] developed an IPv6-Plugin to monitor IPv6 messages 
in the SLAAC process and detect attacks based on signatures. 
A Trust Based Security (TBS) mechanism was proposed in 
[5] to ensure the integrity and availability of NDP messages in 
IPv6 through a central management system. All the above 
proposals require extra and complex process to provide such 
security mechanisms, in addition to the high overhead requirements. 
In this paper we study and compare the performance of 
different defence mechanisms, which are widely supported by 
most networks, against RA flood attacks for IPv6 networks. 
The defence mechanisms considered here are Access Control 
Lists (ACLs), Disable Router Discovery, RA Guard, Validate 
Source MAC and VLAN. The mechanisms are compared 
according to their TCP throughput, TCP round-trip time 
(RTT) and CPU utilisation. RA flood attacks are generated in 
three ways. The test environment consists of a router, an 
attacker machine, a victim machine with Linux Debian 7.5 
operating system, and two monitoring machines. To authors’ 
knowledge there is no such study to compare these 
mechanisms yet. Results show that ACL mechanisms are the 
most effective methods to protect against such attacks. 
The paper is organized as follows, section 2 includes a 
detailed discussion on RA flood attacks on IPv6 neighbour 
discovery protocol. Section 3 discusses the working principles 
of the studied defence mechanisms against RA flood attacks, 
followed by the network setup in Section 4. An analytical 
comparison of the performance for the studied defence 
mechanisms regarding the throughput, the RTT and CPU 
utilisation is presented in section 5, and finally the conclusion 
in is presented in section 6. 
II. ROUTER ADVERTISEMENT FLOOD ATTACKS 
IPv6 networks rely on multicast addresses to communicate 
with all-nodes in the network, using multicast address ff02::1, 
and to communicate with all-routers, using multicast address 
ff02::2. NDP process uses ICMPv6 to support its management 
and control functionalities within the local network. One of 
these functionalities is Stateless Address Auto-configuration 
(SLAAC) to allow hosts to generate their own link-local IPv6 
addresses to communicate with other hosts within the subnet. 
The generated local IPv6 addresses depend on the on-link 
prefix information and the default router address that are 
included in the router advertisement message (To 
communicate with nodes in other subnets, the node needs to 
use a global IPv6 address). If a host needs a local-link IPv6 
address, it sends a Router Solicitation request to the all-
routers multicast address (ff02::2) and the immediate router 
responds by sending a RA to all-nodes multicast address 
(ff02::1) [9, 10].  
Since there are no authentication mechanisms in place for 
the Router Discovery and SLAAC processes, an attacker can 
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launch a DoS attack known as RA flood attack by 
transmitting masses of malicious RA messages (ICMP 
packets) on the local network segment targeting these 
multicast addresses to overwrite the legitimate routing entries 
on a host’s interface, causing these nodes to lose their 
connections to the network and overflow the entire network 
with these malicious packets. 
In addition to flooding the network with thousands of 
packets, RA message can be fragmented into several 
unnecessary parts to confuse some default security 
mechanisms, as the fragments do not hold enough information 
for the network devices to make decision about these packets, 
and they do not have the ability to reassemble the original 
packets, which allows the fragments to bypass the security 
devices in the network. Those fragments can also exhaust the 
resources of the victim nodes during reconstruction [6], and if 
the attacker drops few fragments it will be impossible to 
reconstruct the RA message at the destination node, causing 
the victim node to suffer from overload fragment reassembly 
buffers. 
Another way to deceive the network security devices is to 
use many extension headers for RA messages. This will push 
the payload that contains the upper layer protocol (ULP), i.e. 
the ICMP payload, away from the initial fragment. Since 
network devices do not have the ability to reassemble the 
fragments to parse the entire ICMP packet, processing each 
fragment individually will not help to identify that these 
ICMP fragments belong to an attack, as individual fragments 
do not contain enough information for the network device to 
make a decision. Thus, the RA flood attack can go through 
the network [11]. 
Many tools are available to perform RA flood attacks, such 
as Flood_router26 from The Hackers Choice (THC) IPv6 
toolkit, ra6 from SI6 Networks' IPv6 toolkit and Scapy [12, 
13, 14]. 
III. DEFENCE MECHANISMS AGAINST RA FLOOD 
ATTACKS 
There is no single defence mechanism that is able to provide 
all the security and monitoring services against all types of 
attacks. Below is a description of the defence mechanisms, 
which are considered in this work:  
 Access Control Lists: ACLs have proven to be effective 
against DoS flood attacks [15, 16]. ACLs can ensure that 
NDP ICMPv6 messages such as Router Advertisements 
are not permitted if they arrive to the network from the 
Internet or other networks [17]. ACLs can also be 
configured to drop incoming malicious Router 
Advertisements on Ethernet ports to which end-user 
computers are connected, since only router ports can 
transmit Router Advertisements (port-based ACLs). Other 
usages of ACLs that they can be configured to search for 
certain keywords may appear in the attacking packets that 
rely on fragmentation and block them. One keyword is 
''fragments'' that appears when RA flood attack packets are 
fragmented. Using ACLs the security devices can assume 
that these fragments belong to a malicious RA message 
and discard them, as legitimate RA messages do not need 
to be fragmented. Another keyword is "undetermined-
transport", which is contained in the RA flood attack 
fragments when the header is extended and the first 
fragment does not contain the ULP part. Again, these 
fragments will be discarded as the ULP is expected to be 
in the initial fragment. 
 Disable Router Discovery (Manual Configuration): If IP 
addresses are configured manually on a host, the auto 
router discovery will be disabled and most operating 
systems ignore any RA messages a host receives and 
prevent many common NDP attacks [18].  
 RA Guard: is a mitigating technique used in layer 2 
switches meant to immediately drop incoming router 
advertisements on a port if the device connected to it is not 
a router. Thus, it can prevent malicious hosts from 
launching DoS attacks [11, 18]. 
 Validation of Source MAC Addresses: ports on layer 2 
switches can be configured to bind the source MAC 
addresses of NDP packets with their corresponding source 
link-local IPv6 address of the router. NDP packets which 
do not provide this match will be dropped, as they will be 
spoofing-based attacks [19]. 
 VLAN Partitioning: using VLAN in a network reduces the 
impact of the DoS attacks, as only the partition that suffers 
from the attack will be affected. Nevertheless, these 
attacks exhaust the switch’s finite hardware resources by 
flooding the switch with unnecessary packets. 
IV. NETWORK SETUP 
Fig.1 shows the testing environment used in the evaluation 
of the defence mechanism. The network consists of a router, 
 
Fig. 1 The test environment to evaluate the defence mechanisms 
against RA flood attacks. 
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two monitoring computers with Windows OS, one attack 
computer with Kali Linux OS and one victim computer with 
Debian 7.5 operating system. The router is configured to 
automatically distribute IPv6 addresses using the SLAAC 
process with prefix 2001:db8:1:1a2b::/64. The automatically 
configured computers use this prefix to generate their local 
IPv6 addresses. The attacker and the victim computers are on 
auto IPv6 configuration, while the monitoring computers are 
on static IPv6 configuration. During the attack, the victim 
computer (and all other computers with automatic 
configuration for IPv6, except the attacker) loses its network 
connection. The monitoring computers are equipped with 
Iperf and TCPing to record TCP throughput and TCP RTT, 
respectively. To monitor the CPU utilization of the victim 
machine, Saidar tool is used on the victim machine. In 
addition, Wireshark is also installed on the monitoring 
computers to observe the attack traffic. Results are gathered 
before and during the RA flood attacks as well as after the 
defence mechanisms are implemented 
Two types of layer 2 switch in Fig. 1 are used, Cisco 
3560G switch is used for most of the defence mechanisms 
except for RA Guard and Validate Source MAC defences, 
where Cisco 300-10 switch is used, as those two mechanisms 
are not supported by Cisco 3560G switch. On the other hand, 
Cisco 300-10 switch does not support IPv6 ACLs. 
The attacker is equipped with THC Flood_router26 tools to 
emulate RA flood attack. Flood_router26 floods the local link 
with around 100000 RA messages per second to all nodes 
multicast address (ff02::1). This prevents computers from 
joining the IPv6 network and causes computers that have 
already joined the network using automatic configuration for 
their IPv6 to lose their network connections [20]. The attacks 
are generated in three different ways:  
1. Attack 1: The default RA flood attack with single packets 
flooding the network. 
2. Attack 2: RA flood attack with packets, where each one is 
divided into two fragments before sending.  
3. Attack 3: RA flood attack with packets, where each one is 
extended over a large followed by a fragment.  
The configurations of the used defence mechanisms are 
summarized in Table 1. All defences are configured on the 
switch except Disable Router Discovery configured on the 
host. 
V. RESULTS ANALYSIS 
The performance of these deference mechanisms against the 
three types of attacks is analysed according to TCP 
throughput (the average number of Byte received successfully 
by the destination over the link at a given time), TCP round-
trip time (RTT) (the time between sending the TCP segment 
and receiving the acknowledgment) between the monitoring 
computers, as the victim computer will lose its network 
connection once the attack is started, and CPU utilisation on 
the victim machine. 
A. Attack 1: The default RA flood attack 
Fig. 2 shows the average TCP throughput percentage with 
and without the defence mechanisms using the two switches, 
Cisco 3560G and Cisco 300-10. The throughput percentages 
during the attack and after applying the defences are 
calculated in relation to the throughput before the attack 
(which is considered 100%). During the attack, the throughput 
is dropped severely to nearly no throughput (0.65% in case of 
Cisco 3560G switch and 0.32% in case of Cisco 300-10 
switch). Disable Router Discovery does not have any effects 
as it does not try to fight the malicious RA messages, it only 
makes the victim machine to ignore the malicious messages. It 
could only increase the throughput to 0.70% of the original 
TABLE   I 
A SETTING SUMMARY OF THE USED DEFENCE MECHANISMS. 
 
Defence 
mechanism 
Description / Configuration 
ACLs - drop any RA message not coming from the router 
port. 
- drop RA fragments with keywords "fragment" or 
"undetermined-transport", as they are most likely to 
belong to malicious RA messages. 
Disable router 
discovery 
- static configuration. 
- turn off router discovery (the received RA message 
is not processed). 
RA Guard define a policy on the switch’s router-port with option 
“Match RA Address” to match the layer 2 source 
address of an incoming RA message with that of the 
legitimate router. 
Validate 
Source MAC 
define a policy for the default VLAN to match the 
source MAC address of the NDP packets against the 
link-local IP address of the router. 
VLAN the victim, attacker and router are on the same VLAN 
while the monitoring computers are on a different 
VLAN. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Average TCP throughput percentage for RA flood attack 
using Cisco 3560G and Cisco 300-10 switches. 
 
Fig. 3 The Average TCP RTT in (ms) for RA flood attack using 
Cisco 3560G and Cisco 300-10 switches. 
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throughput. On the other hand, the other defences 
significantly increase the throughput to more than 99%. 
Fig. 3 shows the average TCP RTT results for the defence 
mechanisms using the two switches. During the attack, the 
RTT is increased to more than 2 milliseconds (increased by 
more than 350% compared to the value before the attack). All 
the defence mechanisms, apart from Disable Router 
Discovery, reduce the RTT to a level equivalent to RTT 
before the attack. Disable Router Discovery failed to reduce 
the RTT to an acceptable level, for the same reason described 
before. 
Fig. 4 shows the average CPU utilisation results for the 
defence mechanisms. The attack did not have any effect on 
victim’s CPU utilisation, which continued to be extremely 
low, as Debian operating system on the victim machine sets a 
constraint on the number of route advertisement information it 
receives over a period of time [20]. Even after using the 
defence mechanisms, Debian did not process any Router 
Advertisements. All defences dropped the Router 
Advertisements at the switch except Disable Router 
Discovery, but for Disable Router Discovery the victim 
machine drops the unused Router Advertisements without 
having any effect on the CPU utilisation. 
 
 
 
B. Attack 2: RA flood attack with two-fragment packets 
Using the second type of RA flood attacks where each 
packet is divided into two fragments before sending, Fig. 5 
illustrates the average TCP throughput with and without the 
defences as a percentage of the throughput before the attack. 
When the attack is launched, the throughput is dropped to less 
that 1% of the original throughput before the attack (near 0 
Mbps). After using the defence mechanisms; ACL, ACL 
Fragments, ACL Undetermined-transport and VLAN 
managed to bring the throughput back to more than 99%, with 
marginal differences between these mechanisms. However, 
Disable Router Discovery, RA Guard and Validate Source 
MAC are ineffective, as these defences do not have the ability 
to stop the fragments, and the malicious fragments managed 
to flood the network. 
Similar behaviour is shown for the average TCP RTT in 
Fig. 6. The attack increases the RTT to more than 2 
milliseconds. Defences ACL, ACL Fragments, ACL 
Undetermined-transport and VLAN managed to bring the 
RTT back close to its original value before the attack. Disable 
Router Discovery, RA Guard and Validate Source MAC 
failed to make any differences, as the switch has not got the 
ability to reconstruct the fragments and make decision to filter 
out the attacking packets. 
 
Fig. 4 Average CPU utilisation before and during the attack, and 
after using the defence mechanisms for RA flood attack. 
 
Fig. 5 Average TCP throughput percentage for RA flood attack with 
two-fragment packets using Cisco 3560G and Cisco 300-10 
switches. 
 
Fig. 6 Average TCP RTT for RA flood attack with two-fragment 
packets using Cisco 3560G and Cisco 300-10 switches. 
 
Fig. 7 Average CPU utilisation using the defence mechanisms for 
RA flood attack with two-fragment packets. 
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Fig. 7 shows the average CPU utilisation for these defences. 
As in attack 1, the CPU utilisation was very low prior to the 
attack and no significant changes are shown after using the 
defence mechanisms. As explained before, this is due to that 
Debian OS sets a constraint on the number of RA information 
it receives over a period of time. 
C. Attack 3: RA flood attack with extended-header packets 
For type 3 of the RA flood attack where each packet is 
divided into a large header without ULP followed by a 
fragment before sending. Five defence mechanisms were 
evaluated against RA Flood Attack 3, namely ACL, ACL 
Fragments, ACL Undetermined-transport, Disable Router 
Discovery and VLAN. With RA Guard and Validate Source 
MAC the attack exhausts the resources of the switch because 
it is not possible to send any legitimate packets to measure the 
TCP throughput and TCP RTT when they are used. For that 
there is no need to consider Cisco 300-10 switch, only Cisco 
3560G switch.  
Fig. 8 shows the average TCP throughput, with and without 
defences, as a percentage of the throughput before the attack. 
During the attack, the throughput has dropped to around 
68.50%. Only VLAN and ACL Undetermined-transport 
managed to increase the throughput close to its full capacity 
before the attack (more than 98.5%). 
Fig. 9 illustrates the average TCP RTT with and without 
defences. The RTT increased from 0.582 milliseconds to 
0.885 milliseconds during the attack. ACL Undetermined-
transport managed to reduce the RTT from 0.885 to 0.588 
milliseconds, very close to the value before the attack. VLAN 
is also effective as the RTT has dropped from 0.885 
milliseconds to 0.599 milliseconds. ACL, ACL Fragments 
and Disable Router Discovery also reduced the RTT, 
however; they are not as effective as VLAN and ACL 
Undetermined-transport. 
The average CPU utilisation in attack 3 it is similar to two 
previous attacks. The CPU utilisation was very low before the 
attack and no a significant change is observed during the 
attack and after the defence mechanisms are used. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper provides a comprehensive evaluation of 
performance for different defence mechanisms against route 
advertisement (RA) flood attacks for victim nodes with Linux 
Debian operating system. The performance is compared 
according to TCP throughput, TCP round trip time (TTR) and 
CPU utilisation. Three types of RA flood attacks are 
considered: Attack1: the default RA flood attack with 
thousands of single packets flooding the network. Attack2: 
the RA packets are fragmented into two parts to flood the 
network in order to bypass network security devices and 
complicate the reconstruction of the RA messages at the 
destination node. Attack 3: the RA packets use an extended 
header and fragments to bypass the network security devices.  
Several defence mechanisms are considered here, namely 
ACL (with ACL Fragments and ACL Undetermined-
transport), Disable Router Discovery, RA Guard, Validate 
Source MAC and VLAN. The network setup consists of a 
router to generate RA messages, an attacker machine to 
generate the RA flood attacks, a victim machine with Linux 
Debian operating system and two monitoring machines 
equipped with Iperf, TCPing, and Windows Resource 
Monitoring tools to record TCP throughput, TCP RTT and 
CPU utilisation, respectively. The victim machine loses its 
network connection once any type of the attacks is launched.  
Test results show that ACL mechanisms provide the best 
performance and managed to restore the status of the victim 
machine very close to its status before the attack. On the other 
hand, Disable Router Discovery, RA Guard and Validate 
Source MAC are the least effective ones. For attack 2 ACL 
(fragments) and ACL (undetermined-transport) give the same 
performance and both outperform the original ACL. For 
attack 3 ACL (undetermined-transport) outperforms ACL 
(fragments) and gives throughput and RTT very close to the 
one before the attack. 
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